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Abstract 
This paper examines risks for political independence of public service media in European Union 
Member States by examining safeguards for guaranteeing independence of public service media’s 
governance and its funding mechanisms. The analysis was conducted in 19 EU countries through a 
questionnaire-based method. Local experts from each of the examined countries evaluated media 
policy on the appointment procedures for management and board functions in the PSM, and 
mechanisms of providing funding to the PSM by the government. In addition to examining media 
policy related to these issues, local teams also evaluated the extent to which these are implemented. 
The results show that in five out of 19 analysed countries local experts have described media policy as 
insufficient in providing fair, objective and transparent appointment procedures for management and 
board functions in PSM. Furthermore, more than half of the countries which considered national 
media policy on appointment procedures to be well defined in safeguarding PSM’s independence, 
declared some degree of risk in the implementation of this policy, pointing to situations in which the 
government or other political groupings have in the past few years tried to interfere with the 
appointment processes. Also, results show that there are large differences in the mechanisms of PSM 
funding. Overall, results point to differences in media policies concerned with PSM’s governance and 
funding among EU countries, with many risks associated with these policies and their implementation. 
Keywords 
Comparative analysis, public service media, European Union, political independence, risk. 
 1 
Introduction 
Public service media is considered to be the ‘cornerstone of democracy’ (Bardoel and dHaensen 2008: 
350), and much has been written about the ways in which it contributes to democratic and societal 
processes, particularly in Europe. Due to its perceived importance, it is also recognized in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam (CEC, 1997:109) that explicitly states that ‘the system of public broadcasting in the 
[European Union] Member States is directly related to the democratic, social and cultural needs of 
each society and to the need to preserve media pluralism.’ 
This paper reports data from the Media Pluralism Monitor 2015 project
1
, which aims to identify 
risks to media pluralism in Member States of the European Union. Particularly, the paper focuses on 
the part of the project whose aim was to identify media policies, and the ways in which these are 
implemented, related to safeguarding political independence of public service media across 19 
Member States of the European Union.  
Accordingly, the main research question which the paper aims to address is: At what kinds of risks 
from the influences of the state are the European public service media? 
One of the main reasons why political independence of the PSM is considered important is because 
it is believed that PSM under political influence might produce content which is biased in favour of 
the government and parties that support it. This would mean that the PSM does not represent all 
political viewpoints in a society in a fair and balanced way. Consequently, it is feared that such 
content may reduce voters’ ability to make rational and well-informed decisions. In the words of Mona 
Krewel, ‘[t]he automony of PSM is an elementary precondition for pluralistic media coverage and 
hence for a functioning democracy’ (2015: 126). It can be argued the independence of the PSM is 
particularly important in Europe, since PSM are usually among the most watched television programs 
in European countries, consumed by more than a third of the television audience in countries where 
they are strongest (Benson and Powers, 2011; Klimkiewicz, 2015). Hence, they matter due to their 
wide reach. 
The findings of this analysis allow mapping the state of play of the political independence of PSM 
systems in EU countries, and contribute to identifying elements of PSM systems which are most at 
risk from political interference and best practices of how these risks can be mitigated.  
Political Influence Over PSM 
It is claimed that governments have always been partners to European PSM
2
 (Bardoel and dHaensen, 
2008), although it should be acknowledged that the relationship between many governments and PSM 
was sometimes far from being a partnership. Rather, in many cases and over many decades 
governments of various EU countries have tried to exert political influence over PSM and its content, 
leading Papathanassopoulos (2007:153) to conclude that ‘disputes over the independence of public 
broadcasting are general to the history of European media’. Indeed, Mungiu-Pippidi (2003: 40) noted 
writing in the early 2000s that the independence of PSM in Europe is still ‘unfinished business’, even 
                                                     
1
 More information about the project is available here: http://monitor.cmpf.eui.eu/.The author participated in the 
implementation of the Media Pluralism Monitor 2015 as part of the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom 
(EUI), together with Elda Brogi, Lisa Ginsborg, Alina Ostling and Pier Luigi Parcu. 
2
 In spite of the fact that almost all countries in the world have a PSM of some kind; it needs to be acknowledged that there 
are many differences between PSM systems. The focus of this paper is on the PSM systems in Europe. European PSM 
are characterised by the low cost of accessibility, high availability, promotion of diversity and pluralism, catering for 
minorities, and overall focus on political, cultural, and educational content (Bardoel and dHaensen, 2008; 
Papathanassopoulos, 2007; Smith 2012), which is not how PSM necessarily function in other parts of the world.  
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in its Western parts. This paper follows Mungiu-Pippidi’s definition of the independence of the public 
service media according to which PSM’s independence from political influences is defined as the 
ability of ‘both managers and journalists to run public service television and its programs as they see 
fit and without government interference’ (2003: 34).  
The Council of Europe emphasized in its Recommendation to Member States on public service 
media governance (2012) that many European countries still face the challenge of securing 
independence from political influences, which are usually exerted by the government. Despite the fact 
that PSM in almost all EU Member States face a range of challenges, the most problematic systems 
from the viewpoint of their political independence appear to be those in Southern and Central Eastern 
Europe. It is argued that the appointments of the PSM boards in the countries of the Central Eastern 
Europe are one of the most common techniques of retaining control over public media (Jakubowicz, 
2008), since ‘political groups both on the right and the left of the political spectrum share a common 
conception of the media as an instrument of political power, and public service television in particular 
as the instrument of political power’ (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003: 43, see also Bajomi-Lázár, 2015). The 
most recent case comes from Poland, which introduced new legislation in early 2016 that grants the 
government control over appointing and dismissing public service media’s management boards 
(Klimkiewicz, 2016).  
European post-communist countries are not the only ones historically seen as struggling with the 
independence of PSM, since South European governments have been (in)famous for their control over 
PSM through appointments as well. Appointments to the PSM boards based on partisan political 
criteria were common in countries such as Spain and Greece for decades, and they were also seen as a 
mechanism of a clientelistic society since they were used for returning favours by political elites to 
their supporters (Papatheodorou and Machin, 2003). It should be added that these types of 
appointments not only diminish the political independence of the PSM, but they can also be 
problematic for the functioning of the PSM. Where politically appointed members do not have 
sufficient skills and knowledge to make well-informed decisions from which the PSM would benefit, 
these deficiencies of the management structures may create further problems for this media. Overall, 
Jakubowicz (2008) argues that the PSM systems in the Central Eastern and Southern Europe share 
many similarities. However, rare studies engage in comparative analysis of the PSM systems, and 
particularly their political independence.  
The most recent attempt to compare PSM systems and examine their political independence was 
Media Pluralism Monitor 2014 project (MPM2014) which examined the risks for political 
independence of PSM across nine EU countries
3
. The MPM2014 examined both the legal framework 
in which PSM operate, and the extent to which the legislation is implemented and in practice ensures 
PSM’s independence (Brogi and Dobreva, 2015). It was found that Hungary and Italy are at high risk 
from political interference through appointment procedures to PSM boards, while Hungary was also 
declared as being at high risk from political control through the ways in which their PSM was funded, 
alongside Estonia and Greece. 
The MPM2014 findings were in line with those from the European Media Systems survey (2010). 
This survey asked experts in European media questions about European countries’ media systems, one 
of the questions being about the level of political independence of the PSM. Experts’ evaluations 
revealed that the PSM in Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden) are seen as most 
independent from political influences, while those in Southern and Central Eastern Europe were 
declared least independent (of the EU countries lowest independence has been estimated in Italy, 
Malta, Romania and Slovakia). It should be noted that these findings primarily revealed the perception 
of a PSM’s independence, rather than their actual independence, since the answers were based on 
experts’ evaluations. However, both MPM2014 and the European Media Systems survey show that the 
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 Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, United Kingdom 
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old practices of political elites trying to exert influence over the PSM in South and Central Eastern 
Europe are far from being the matters of the past. They also point to the fact that these issues should 
be regularly monitored in order for the public and stakeholders to be aware of the challenges and risks 
associated with the PSM.  
What to monitor? 
The Council of Europe’s Recommendation to Member States on public service media governance 
(2012) outlines steps which should be taken for strengthening PSM’s independence in Europe, 
primarily focusing on the development of appropriate funding processes and appointment procedures 
for the PSM board(s). Indeed, PSM funding and appointment procedures to their board(s) are those 
mechanisms which are most frequently described as the most important for securing political 
independence of a PSM (Bardoel and dHaensen, 2008; Benson and Powers,2011; Hanretty, 2009; 
Papatheodorou and Machin, 2003), and are hence among the most important ones to regularly 
monitor. 
The way in which PSM is funded is, according to Bardoel and dHaensen (2008: 349), the key issue 
related to the PSM’s political independence, and it has also been identified as important for securing 
political independence by the European Parliament. In its Resolution on public service broadcasting in 
the digital era (2010), European parliament recommended to the EU Member States to ‘provide 
appropriate, proportionate and stable funding for public service media so as to enable them to fulfil 
their remit, guarantee political and economic independence’. Most authors agree that the best way to 
fund PSM in such a way as to ensure its independence from the state, but also retain a stable revenue 
of income, is through the system of licence fees (Bardoel and dHaensen, 2008; Benson and 
Powers,2011; Berg and Lund, 2012; Klimkiewicz, 2015). However, it should be noted that the state 
may have an influence even on the licence fee funded PSM, since it is usually the state which decides 
on the level of the licence fee. In order to minimise this potential risk, The Council of Europe (2012) 
recommends, among other things, that the state needs to ensure that the set level of financing is 
adequate to meet PSM’s needs and that PSM should participate in the decision-making about the level 
of financing. In other words, the state shouldn’t be able to decide the level of licence fee without 
consultations and taking into account the financial needs of the PSM. On the other side of the 
spectrum are usually direct state grants to the PSM, which are often seen as tools through which the 
state can try to influence the PSM (Berg and Lund, 2012; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003; Klimkiewicz, 2015). 
As Papathanassopoulos (2007) argues, even if the state does not try, or succeed, in exerting pressure 
over the PSM through providing direct grants, PSM can still be harmed by this type of funding since it 
can affect the perception of their independence in the eyes of the public. Indeed, there is evidence to 
suggest that PSM’s political independence is correlated with the trust in PSM, so the more the state is 
able to influence the PSM, the less trust in its content citizens have (Connolly and Hargreaves Heap, 
2007). In light of this, the fact that the average percentage of state grants in overall financing increased 
from 10 to 13.3% among European Broadcasting Union’s public service members from 2011 to 2012 
(Klimkiewicz, 2015), might be a cause for concern, or at least a call for better monitoring of the public 
service media’s political independence. 
The other instrument through which the state may be able to control the PSM concerns the 
appointment of its governing body(ies). Council of Europe (2012) holds that it is ‘legitimate for the 
State to be involved in the appointment of the highest supervisory or decision-making authority within 
the public service media’. However, it also emphasises that the appointment processes should be 
designed in such a way as to guarantee independence of the PSM from the state. For example, 
legislation should clearly outline the appointment and dismissal procedures, contain elements which 
would minimise state’s ability to appoint partisan members, appointments should be made for a 
specified term, situations in which members can be dismissed should be limited and legally defined 
etc. In addition, it is suggested that that appointments made for a longer period of time might increase 
PSM’s independence since board members may be less inclined to promote preferences of those that 
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appointed them (Hanretty, 2009). Also, it is speculated that involvement of a larger number of political 
actors in the appointment process may lead to greater independence since ‘the match between any 
appointing actor and the appointed person will be looser’ (Hanretty, 2009: 84). To illustrate, it is 
expected that the PSM would be more independent if the parliament decides on its appointments, 
rather than the government. Of course, this may not always be the case, since in parliamentary 
democracies, which are many EU countries, the government usually has the majority in the 
parliament. For example, Mungiu-Pippidi (2003) noted that the legislative changes which transferred 
the competence over appointments of the PSM boards from governments to parliaments in the Central 
Eastern Europe in 1990s did little to decrease political influence over the PSM.  
In sum, comparative research into political independence of European PSM is limited, and rare 
existing studies point to the fact that many PSM systems in EU Member States are still vulnerable to 
political influences. This paper aims to contribute to the monitoring of PSM’s political independence 
by establishing risks for political independence of PSM across EU Member States. Accordingly, the 
main research question which this paper aims to answer is:  
At what kinds of risks from the influences of the state are the European public service media? 
Research Design 
This paper reports on the findings from the Media Pluralism Monitor 2015, a study consequent to that 
mentioned earlier (MPM2014), in which the risks for political independence of the PSM have been 
examined in the 19 EU countries not tested in the 2014 project. Particularly, the paper focuses on the 
part of the project whose aim was to identify media policies related to safeguarding political 
independence of public service media. This was done by examining legal safeguards for guaranteeing 
independence of public service media’s management and its funding mechanisms, but also by 
evaluating the extent to which these legal safeguards are actually implemented and the PSM is 
independent in practice.  
The analysis was conducted in 19 Member States of the EU
4
 through a questionnaire-based 
method. Local teams from each of the examined countries evaluated media policy on the appointment 
procedures for management and board functions in the PSM, and mechanisms of providing funding to 
it by the state. The evaluations of the actual independence of the PSM needed to be supported by 
evidence. Furthermore, some of these indicators have also been subjected to the group of experts’ 
revision. This procedure entailed a number of national experts in media freedom reviewing local 
teams’ evaluations, and providing alternative evaluations supported by evidence when appropriate. In 
situations where any of the national experts disagreed with the evaluation of the country team, the 
team needed to amend their answer or explain why the disagreement wasn’t taken into account in 
providing the final answer (for more details about project’s methodology see Brogi et al., 2016).  
The decision to focus on the PSM management and funding was based on the existing literature 
and previous studies which outlined these two mechanisms as most important for securing political 
independence. In line with the ideas put forward by Hanretty (2009) and in line with the MPM2014 
study, indicators to assess the independence were divided into de iure, assessing legal framework, and 
de facto, aiming to assess the extent to which PSM is independent in practice
5
. De iure/legal questions 
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 Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
5
 Hanretty (2009) was among the first ones to raise the question about the connection of the de jure independence, which 
can be measured by the examination of the legal framework in which a PSM operates, and its actual, de facto 
independence. He argues that legislation may not be completely clear or enforced, so examining the regulations does not 
necessarily tell us whether or not a PSM is actually independent in practice. In order to test the connection between the de 
jure and de facto independence, Hanretty created an index of de jure independence consisting of several indicators 
(including PSM funding, and appointment and dismissal procedures for its board) and examined its correlation with 
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had the option to be answered as yes or no, while de facto/practice questions were coded as low, 
medium, or high risk. Each answer was calibrated on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 describing a situation 
of low risk, and 1 situation of high risk. Specifically, each ‘yes’ and ‘low risk’ answer were coded as 
0, ‘medium risk’ as 0.5, while ‘no’ and ‘high risk’ answers were coded as 1. Two other answer options 
were offered for each question – ‘not applicable’ and ‘no data’. Answers coded as ‘not applicable’ 
were excluded from the analysis. Each ‘no data’ answer had to be accompanied by a local team’s 
comment in which the team evaluated whether or not the lack of data should be seen as problematic 
within the national context. Two independent coders then recoded the ‘no data’ answer as showing 
either low or high risk according to a strict set of criteria. For each of the two examined mechanisms 
(management and funding) the value of the de iure and de facto independence was calculated as the 
mean of all its indicators, the value of the mechanism is the mean of its de iure and de facto elements, 
and the final risk for the independence of the PSM is measured as the mean of the two mechanisms.  
Table 1: Index of risk for PSM independence
6
 
Management –  
de iure/legal 
Management –  
de facto/practice 
Funding –  
de iure/legal 
Funding –  
de facto/ practice 
1. Does the law (e.g. media 
law, administrative law, 
company law, labour law, 
conventions between PSM 
and the government) 
provide fair, objective and 
transparent appointment 
procedures for management 
and board functions in 
PSM?  
 
2. Is there an administrative 
or judicial body tasked to 
actively monitor the 
compliance with these rules 
and/or hearing complaints? 
 
3. Does the law grant that 
body effective 
sanctioning/enforcement 
powers in order to impose 
proportionate remedies in 
case of noncompliance with 
the rules?  
4. Do these appointment 
procedures guarantee the 
independence of PSM 
boards and management 
from government and/or 
a single political group?  
 
5. Are the legal 
safeguards for 
appointment and 
dismissal procedures for 
management and board 
functions in PSM 
implemented in practice?  
1. Does media law 
prescribes transparent 
and objective procedures 
on determining the 
amount of money to be 
granted to PSM?  
2. How would you 
describe the mechanism 
of providing financing to 
the PSM by the 
government?  
 
3. What is the percentage 
of direct government 
financing for the PSM?  
(Contd.)                                                                  
PSM’s de facto independence which was measured through a proxy based on the executive turnover. The results showed 
that well established legal framework which guarantees political independence of the PSM indeed ensures its 
independence, but only when the size of the market for news is taken into account. In other words, ‘assuming average 
press circulation, an increase from no legal protection to full legal protection would result in an increase from negligible 
to almost total de facto independence’ (ibid., 88). 
6
 For questions’ descriptions and methods of measurement see Brogi et al. (2016) 
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It should be emphasised that this is a risk-based exercise in which the final score, which is presented 
as a percentage on a scale from 0 to 100, represents the degree of risk for the PSM political 
independence. This means that a high risk does not necessarily mean that the PSM is not independent, 
but that it is vulnerable to political influences
7
. Accordingly, a low risk assessment does not mean that 
a PSM is not under political influence, but rather that some appropriate safeguards of its political 
independence exist. Finally, scores between 0 and 33% are considered low risk, 34 to 66% medium 
risk, while those between 67 and 100% high risk. 
Findings 
The main finding of this study is that public service media in some Member States of the EU are still 
at high risk from political influences, and that overall, there are many differences among EU states in 
the type of risk for political independence, but also its extent. This study reinforces findings from 
previous studies in the sense that North and Western European PSM systems seem to be at less risk 
from political influences, than those in Southern and Central Eastern Europe. 
Specifically, the analysis showed that five EU countries have PSM with high risk for political 
independence (Cyprus, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain), six countries are at medium risk 
(Austria, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland
8
, and Slovakia), while in eight countries the risk for PSM 
independence is low (Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal 
and Sweden). 
  
                                                     
7
 More details about risk assessments can be found in Brogi and Dobreva (2015) 
8
 It should be noted that research took place during May – June 2015, and hence did not capture legislative changes related 
to appointment of PSM boards in Poland which took place in January 2016. 
Comparative analysis of risks for political independence of Public Service Media  
7 
Map 1: Risks for political independence of the PSM in 19 EU Member States 
 
 
In spite of the fact that Southern and Central Eastern European countries in general score medium and 
high risk, and Northern and Western European countries low risk, there are notable exceptions to this. 
One of these is Portugal, a Southern European country which was mentioned as being one of those in 
which political elites historically tried to influence PSM. However, Portugal is an interesting example 
of how the risk for the political independence of the PSM can decrease with the introduction of 
appropriate legislation. In particular, Portugal introduced several novelties in the legal framework 
related to the PSM over the past few years which, according to the local team, decreased state’s 
possibilities of influence. For example, in 2014 Independent general council, tasked with appointing 
PSM board members according to a set of clear, objective and transparent criteria, was established to 
act as a buffer between the state and the PSM. However, it remains to be seen how these legislative 
changes will be implemented and with what effects on political independence of Portuguese PSM, so 
further monitoring is essential. Also, direct grants to the Portuguese PSM were abolished in 2013. 
Furthermore, Czech Republic is an example of a Central Eastern European country which scores low 
risk, although at its higher end. In particular, this is due to the fact that there is no body which would 
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monitor the implementation of a well-established legislation concerning appointment procedures, and 
also there have been certain attempts of political interference with the appointments in the past couple 
of years. However, the majority of funding for the PSM comes from the licence fee which is 
enumerated in the law and can only be amended by the parliament, what creates a low risk situation 
for PSM funding. It is also worth emphasising the case of Ireland, whose PSM is assessed as at 
medium risk from political influences. This is primarily due to the fact that the state has great 
influence over the appointments and dismissals of the PSM board members.  
Risks From Management 
The analysis of the legislation concerning appointments to the PSM boards showed that in five out of 
19 examined countries (Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Slovenia, and Spain) the law does not provide fair, 
objective, and transparent appointment procedures of the PSM board, which would minimise state’s 
ability to exert influence. Furthermore, six out of 14 countries which do have good legislation do not 
have a body which would monitor its implementation and hear complaints (Austria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Netherlands, Romania, and Slovakia), so it may be much easier to interfere with the law if 
there is no institution which oversees it and is in control of its implementation. In addition, of the 
countries that have appropriate legal safeguards and bodies monitoring their implementation, in one 
case this body is not granted effective powers which would give it legitimacy and ability to effectively 
supervise implementation of the law (this is the case in Poland). In sum, only seven out of 19 studied 
PSM systems have appropriate legal safeguards which might help them in avoiding political influence 
via appointment procedures (these are Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
and Sweden).  
However, as noted by Hanretty (2009), legal safeguards do not always guarantee independence in 
practice, what is shown by this research as well. In particular, three out of seven countries with 
appropriate legal safeguards have some problems in the implementation of these laws, with evidence 
of political actors trying to influence management boards of the PSM (Finland, Latvia, Sweden). 
Overall, only four countries in the sample have appropriate laws which are well implemented and are 
securing the independence of the PSM management (Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal). 
Consequently, six countries score high risk for the independence of the PSM management (Cyprus, 
Ireland, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain), four score medium (Austria, Czech Republic, Romania, 
and Slovakia), and nine are assessed as at low risk from political influence over PSM management 
boards (Croatia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Sweden). 
Risks From Funding 
Examination of the legislation concerned with the funding of PSM revealed that six out of 19 studied 
countries do not have media law prescribing transparent and objective procedures on determining the 
amount of money to be granted to PSM (Austria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia). 
Furthermore, five out of 13 countries that do have appropriate legal provisions are evaluated as at risk 
due to the ways in which governments are able to decide the amount of money to be granted to the 
PSM (Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and Spain). In our sample, half of examined countries 
(n=9) have PSM that receives substantial direct state grants, which is considered to represent a risk to 
its independence, i.e. grants could be used as a point of pressure from the state. Overall, when it comes 
to risks from the PSM funding, five EU countries score high risk (Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
and Slovenia), five score medium risk (Austria, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and Spain), and half of 
all examined countries are at low risk from political influences from the ways in which the PSM is 
funded (see table 2 for details).  
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Table 2: Risks per mechanism and overall risk for political independence of the PSM 
 Management risk in % Funding risk in % overall PSM risk in % 
Austria 63 50 57 
Croatia 25 0 13 
Cyprus 100 100 100 
Czech Republic 50 6 28 
Finland 25 25 25 
Germany 0 0 0 
Ireland 100 13 57 
Latvia 13 100 57 
Lithuania 0 100 50 
Luxembourg 0 38 19 
Malta 100 44 72 
Netherlands 25 25 25 
Poland 67 0 34 
Portugal 0 0 0 
Romania 63 88 76 
Slovakia 38 38 38 
Slovenia 100 94 97 
Spain 100 50 75 
Sweden 13 0 7 
Comparison of risks 
It is interesting to note that the majority of countries either score low risk for both mechanisms 
(management and funding), or medium and high risk. To illustrate, PSM in Cyprus, Slovenia, 
Romania, Spain, Malta, Austria and Slovakia are at medium or high risk from both management and 
funding mechanisms, while Croatia, Germany, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and Netherlands have low 
risk assessments for both mechanisms. Hence, it could be speculated that countries with one type of 
risk are more likely to be at another type of risk for political independence.  
In this context it is also interesting to more closely examine the cases in which there is little risk 
from one type of influence, but significant risk from another type. Baltic countries Latvia and 
Lithuania are in such a situation. Both countries score high risk from funding, but low risk from 
appointments. Low risks from the political influence via appointments to PSM board are based on the 
fact that, according to local teams, these countries have well implemented laws which provide fair, 
objective and transparent appointment procedures for management and board functions in PSM. For 
example, board members of the Latvia’s PSM are selected in line with the procedures of an open 
competition, and appointed and dismissed by the National Electronic Mass Media Council, according 
to the Electronic Mass Media Law passed in 2010. When it comes to PSM funding, in both countries 
the PSM is primarily funded via state grants. Information about PSM’s 2015 budget reveals that more 
than 70% of Latvia’s PSM is funded by the state, while following the ban of advertising on Lithuanian 
PSM which came into force in 2015, Lithuania’s PSM became fully funded by the state. Pečiulis 
(2010: 83) notes that funding schemes for the Lithuania’s PSM have been discussed for over two 
decades, but that ‘there was an impression that Lithuanian politicians realistically did not want the 
subscription fee to be introduced’ in order to retain their ability to exert political influence over it. 
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There were several recommendations of how to improve the political independence and increase 
stability of revenue through various funding models, but none of them were implemented (Pečiulis, 
2010). Similar developments were observed in Latvia where the Parliamentary committees did not 
support recommendations on funding from the working group consisting of media experts (Brikše, 
2010). Brikše (2010: 74) sums up the developments in Latvia by saying that ‘there has been an entire 
lack of political readiness to identify a financing procedure that would ensure the independence of 
PSM, as well as sufficient resources to ensure high-quality content’. These examples show how 
although one mechanism for ensuring political independence may be well defined and implemented, 
this does not necessarily mean that the PSM is not at risk from political influence since political elites 
may be able to exert pressure via another type of mechanism.  
Implications 
As mentioned in the introduction, it is considered important that public service media is politically 
independent and represents the interests of the public, and no one political group. This is because it is 
feared that PSM under political influence would produce biased content which would hinder citizens’ 
abilities to be well informed about public matters. However, it is wrong to assume that PSM is biased 
in its reporting just because it is under political influence, or that this has any kind of effect on voters.  
In order to examine whether there is any kind of relationship between the risks for political 
independence of PSM and the way in which it reports politics, the findings of this analysis are 
compared with the data about the extent to which PSM reporting in each examined country is 
politically biased. Specifically, the indicator assessing the bias in PSM reporting was based on the 
question from the Media Pluralism Monitor 2015 which asked: ‘Is there evidence to suggest that 
audiovisual coverage of the electoral campaign on PSM offers proportional and non-biased 
representation of the different groups of political actors?’ In other words, local teams were asked to 
evaluate, based on available evidence (content analysis of PSM reports, NGO reports, regulator’s 
reports etc.), the extent to which PSM’s electoral reporting is biased. Answers were calibrated on a 
scale from 0 to 1 as was described previously (i.e. no evidence of bias was given a score of 0/0%, 
some evidence of bias 0.5/50%, and if there was evidence that different groups of political actors are 
represented in a biased and non-proportional way, clearly favouring some political actors over others, 
a score of 1/100% was given).  
The comparison of risks for PSM’s political independence and the political bias in its electoral 
reporting shows that certain relationships exist between risks from political influence and biased 
reporting. For example, those public service media which have biased content are somewhat probable 
to also be at medium or high risk from political interference, since four out of five PSM which have 
biased content are also at risk from political interference. On the other hand, only one out of eight 
PSM which is assessed as at low risk for political independence has some bias in its reporting.  
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Graph 1: Relationship between risks for PSM political independence and the bias in PSM 
electoral reporting 
 
However, what Graph 1 also reveals is that there are many countries in which PSM is at a medium or 
high risk from political influence, but its content remains balanced and unbiased. Specifically, this is 
the case in seven out of 11 Member States whose PSM is assessed as at medium or high risk (Austria, 
Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Romania). One reason for this may be the fact that all 
examined countries have a media law which imposes rules aiming at fair, balanced and impartial 
representation of political viewpoints in news and informative programmes on PSM channels and 
services (Brogi et al., 2016). Furthermore, only two countries in the sample do not have specific legal 
provisions which would impose rules aiming at guaranteeing access to airtime on PSM channels and 
services for political actors during election campaigns, Austria and Finland, however in Finland the 
PSM’s Administrative council sets guidelines to ensure balanced access prior to each elections (Brogi 
et al., 2016). Nord (2015) notes that there is regulation ensuring access to PSM content during 
electoral campaigns also in other EU countries which have not been captured by the sample used for 
analysis in this paper. This all points to the fact that although the state may be able to exert some 
pressure over the PSM, its content can be safeguarded from political influence by regulation which 
aims to ensure pluralism in PSM reporting. 
Conclusions 
The study reported in this paper was set out to examine risks for political independence of the EU 
Member States’ public service media. The data to perform this analysis was collected through the 
Media Pluralism Monitor 2015 project in which local teams across 19 EU countries answered a series 
of questions about national media policies and their implementation, with some of the evaluations of 
the quality of implementation being reviewed by a group of national media experts.  
It should be emphasized again that the presented study is a risk analysis, hence it does not reveal 
whether or not PSM actually is under political influence, and what kind of consequences this has on its 
functioning, content and audience reception. This can, of course, be considered as a limitation of the 
project. Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that the results might be different if other 
mechanisms through which the state can influence the PSM have been considered (e.g. information 
about adequacy of budget, accountability to state, PSM board’s decision practice, board members’ 
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term of office), and if different variables have been used for establishing risks from management and 
funding. However, it was necessary to focus on main mechanisms of exerting pressure, and a limited 
number of variables assessing them, due to the extensiveness of project’s comparative dimension and 
its other constraints (time, resources). 
The results of this analysis show that in five out of 19 analysed countries media policies do not 
provide fair, objective and transparent appointment procedures for management and board functions in 
PSM, which would minimise state’s ability to interfere. Furthermore, more than half of the countries 
that considered national media policy on appointment procedures to be well defined in safeguarding 
PSM’s independence, declared some degree of risk in the implementation of this policy, pointing to 
situations in which the government or other political groupings have in the past few years tried to 
interfere with the appointment processes. Also, results show that there are large differences in the 
mechanisms of funding PSM, and consequently in the ability of the state to interfere in the PSM. In 
some EU countries PSM is completely funded from the state budget (e.g. Finland, Luxembourg), in 
some others the governments do not directly participate in its funding (e.g. Sweden, Austria).  
Overall, results point to differences in media policies concerned with PSM’s political independence 
among EU countries, with many risks associated to these policies and their implementation. Trends 
detected by this study point to the conclusion that public service media in countries of Western and 
Northern Europe are at less risk from political influence, than those in Central Eastern and Southern 
Europe, with some notable exceptions. This suggests that these PSM systems should be still 
considered vulnerable to political influence, what can decrease the quality of their content and the trust 
that citizens have in them. As the case of Portugal indicates, the introduction of appropriate legislation 
and changes in funding mechanisms towards those which minimise state’s ability to exert pressure 
through providing funds may decrease the risks from political influence. However, the implementation 
of these new laws needs to be monitored so it can be determined whether they are effective in practice 
in safeguarding PSM from political influences. Recent legislative changes in Poland, which grant the 
government increased powers over Polish PSM’s management boards, confirm that national 
legislations concerned with PSM independence are in constant flux in Europe, but also that these 
changes do not necessarily reflect the aim to increase PSM’s political independence. 
Regular monitoring of the risks for political independence of the public service media in Europe 
would therefore be beneficial since it would periodically map the state of play of risks for political 
independence of public service media and could serve as a measure of early warning for systems in 
which vulnerabilities are detected.  
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